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IF THERE IS A GENERAL PROJECT that orientates these notes then it can be located in what 
can be described as the question of the ethical subject.
1
 There is of course an initial 
doubling within this question. The subject of the ethical belongs, in the first instance, to a 
topos or a field of concerns, the subject area of the ethical. In the second, it pertains to the 
subject within that field. The latter is the self or the moral agent. However, with both 
these determinations of the ethical subject there is a set of metaphysical considerations 
that have to be brought out. What is important in both is the presence of differing sets of 
relations, thus differing modes of relationality. These are the relations in which the 
question of the individual is present as that which can be understood in terms of 
processes of individuation. Within such processes there is a general question of whether 
the subject and the ethical can be separated. What can always hold, as one possibility, 
would be that positioning of the subject in which the connection to the ethical involved 
no more than a contingent relation. The subject would arrive stripped of original ethical 
concerns. (This is the position that forms—and is formed by—one particular 
determination within what will be called henceforth a metaphysics of nudity.) The 
alternative would be to argue that the ethical is not a contingent predicate, but that the 
subject, the moral agent, is ethical from the start. As such, reflection, now as the 
recognition of that situation, would then have to form a fundamental part of the overall 
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argument. (Indeed it will be in terms of the precondition for the recognition of virtue that 
dignity appears.) Were the always already present relation between the ethical and the 
subject to pertain—a set-up in which this particular construction of the ethical subject 
predominated—then the ethical would be inscribed as a concern at the center of any 
development of a sustained philosophical anthropology. Virtue and being would be 
interarticulated. That interarticulation would have what can be described as an original 
force,
2
 namely, that the ethical was an original condition rather that a mere contingent 
addition to human being.  
The connected point of inquiry therefore concerns the subject as moral agent. It 
involves the question of the extent to which subject positions precede relationality or are 
simply produced as such. At work here is the temporality of relationality. The complexity 
of this predicament is already located in Hannah Arendt’s claim made at the beginning of 
The Human Condition that “men, not man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”3 The 
question that follows from this formulation concerns the status of the subject given that 
any singularity, “man” in this instance, would itself always be an after-effect of an initial 
plurality, here “men.” (What then of the original relation?) Moreover, and this is to mark 
in advance the limit of Arendt’s own thinking, what has to be taken up in addition is the 
nature of this original positioning. What is the status of an already present and thus 
preceding plurality?
4
 (A question that arises once the temporality of relationality figures 
as a central part of any concern with the ethical subject.) Part of what has to be addressed 
in what follows is the problem of how plurality, individuality, and individuation are to be 
understood. That problem can be given a more precise location by noting its presence in 
the opening of the Epistulae morales; indeed, it is present in the first line of Letter 1. 
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Seneca demands of Lucilius vindica te tibi (“claim yourself for yourself,” Sen. Ep.1.1).5 
A position that also occurs in fragments from De clementia that were present in a letter 
by Hildebert of Tours, in which the Prince who shows mercy, “the good prince,” is 
defined thus: Bonus princeps sibi dominator (“A good prince masters himself,” Sen. 
Clem. 448–49). Both formulations open a field of inquiry. Advanced within them is not 
just the project and possibility of self-fashioning but its locus, namely, the self as defined 
by its being self-referring. (The connection and interdependence between them cannot be 
overlooked.) Hence the issue that has to be pursued, almost as a necessary perquisite for 
any encounter with Arendt’s identification of an initial form of plurality, concerns the self 
that is given within the actual possibility of self-definition. Remembering that the status 
of the subject—what will continue to be understood as the ethical subject and thus the 
way it is thought by Seneca (and subsequently by Arendt)—cannot be extricated from its 
inscription within the particular determination that the temporality of relationality has in 
any one instance. As has already been intimated there are two importantly different 
questions: Is relationality prior to individuation? Or is a relation that which occurs, and 
can only occur, between two already individuated subjects? 
 
I 
 
A beginning can be made, therefore, with the problem of singularity, knowing in advance 
that a simple evocation of the subject as existing merely in simpliciter cannot be accurate. 
Suggested by the very possibility of posing the questions noted above is that a form of 
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complexity will have always obtained. Note the following formulation from Epistulae 
morales (120.22):   
 
praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, ceteri multiformes sumus 
 
No one can act as a unified/singular person except the wise; the rest of us 
take on different forms. 
 
The self as a concern for itself, what amounts to the project of self-care, is clear from this 
formulation. Claims of the primacy of the care of self cannot be taken as an end.
6
 What is 
raised as a question is the nature of the self that figures within such a formulation and that 
gives rise to the ensuing question: What thinking of the ethical subject can be found 
within it? Overcoming the possibility of “different forms,” perhaps what would amount 
to the wearing of masks, takes place to the extent that the occurrence of wisdom is 
commensurate with processes of singularization. And yet, even the mask can singularize. 
In Polybius’ description of Roman funeral rites in which the image of the dead were worn 
the “image is a mask” (ἡ δ᾽ εἰκών ἐστι πρόσωπον, Polyb. 6.53.5). The mask here was still 
an unequivocal presentation of the deceased person. The mask therefore did not mask. In 
more general terms, therefore, the singular occurs to the extent that the multiple 
dissipates. (The latter can itself take many forms.) Staged here is, of course, the problem 
of continuity and constancy. The self, the self of self-care, that is defined by the 
continuity of constancy, is wise. Wisdom and virtue are positioned in relation to each 
other. They are inseparable. Virtue is “free, inviolable, unmoved, unshaken” and thus it 
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“steels against the blows of chance” (Sen. Constant. 5.4). Hence the description in De 
vita beata that “the highest good is a mind that scorns the happenings of chance, and 
rejoices only in virtue” (Summum bonum est animus fortuita despiciens, virtute laetus, 
Sen. De vita beata 4.2). Equally, what can be located here is the expression of “liberty.” 
Liberty is not the free engagement with what is, equally it does not involve having to 
tolerate what is. Liberty is neither directly worldly nor world referring. Rather liberty, for 
Seneca, is a state of the soul. It is part of a process of individualizing. Hence liberty is 
defined thus (Sen. De vita beata 19.2): 
 
libertas est animum superponere iniuriis et eum facere se ex quo solo sibi 
gaudenda veniant. 
 
liberty is having a soul that rises above injury and makes itself the only 
source from which its pleasure comes.
7
 
 
What remains for Seneca, though only as position bereft of argumentation, is the 
assumption that the exercise of liberty is unproblematic. It is simply the exercise of the 
soul and thus there cannot be any form of constraint. (As will be suggested at a later stage 
this aspect of his argumentation delimits his conception of the ethical subject in ways that 
announce its own limits. Limits would emerge because constraints are built into the 
problem of freedom once freedom is understood as involving the actualization of a 
potentiality rather than the simple affirmation of self. The latter is the self of self-care.)  
REDRESSING THE METAPHYSICS OF NUDITY 
6 
 
Central to this overall development of the connection between wisdom and virtue 
is the presence of the wise person as exemplary. Wisdom is “the art of life” (ars ... vitae 
est, Sen. Ep. 117.12).
 8
 Though equally, prima ars hominis est ipsa virtus (“man’s 
primary art is virtue itself,” Sen. Ep. 92.10). Hence the continual link between virtue and 
wisdom. (And it should be remembered that virtue is not part of a straightforward 
calculus. Virtue is an activity that has no specific outcome “apart from the virtues 
themselves” [Sen. Clem. 1.1). This is the setting within which the exemplary figure 
creates an image.
9
 Indeed, as will be noted, this image sets the measure. 
The ineliminability of the image and its exemplary force gives rise to an 
inevitable question: that is, what does it mean, however, to follow an image? Could an 
image, an image that was itself already assumed to be one of moral worth, determine in 
advance how a life is to be lived? It would be lived, of course, after having received such 
an image. Were both questions to be answered in the affirmative, then what emerges is a 
set up allowing for lives to be molded—a form of self-molding—such that virtue and thus 
the good life are able to be formed and, as significantly, the self would have lent itself to 
self-forming. The frame within which these processes occur is structured by the relation 
between a determining image and the capacity of a self to mold itself in relation to it. The 
important point is that there cannot be self-molding as though such an activity was simply 
abstract; there will always have been an image, hence there will always have been a 
relation. What this means, in addition, is that virtue and the good life—the latter as the 
life in which the greatest good obtains—are themselves able to be actualized by a subject 
for a subject. Within such a setting there are two unannounced, though pivotal, 
prerequisites. The first is that the locus of virtue is the self as an isolated and isolatable 
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entity. (This is the how the ethical subject, in this context, is being thought.) Given this 
condition it follows that the self (or moral agent) is an isolated singularity. And, 
significantly, has to have been produced as such. The singular self is an act of production. 
What is raised thereby is the question of how what counts as the singular is to be 
understood. (And again it should be noted that while individual responsibility inevitably 
involves a conception of the singular subject, it remains an open question as to how that 
singularity emerges—is it assumed or produced?—and therefore what would be the 
apposite philosophical framework within which it were to be interpreted.) 
The second prerequisite concerns the presence of a relationship between the 
image and the self. Again, there is the question of how the elements of that relationship 
are themselves to be understood. As a beginning, the constant allusion in these opening 
questions needs to be identified. The point of reference is of course the account of 
Seneca’s suicide in Tacitus’ Annals.10 While the figure of Seneca in the Annals is at best 
ambiguous, it is still the case that Seneca’s own self-conception can be attributed an 
important position since it captures the project of self-creation that occurs in his own 
writings. Within the context of this historical self-presentation his concerns were clear. 
As Tacitus recounts events, Seneca wished to write his own will. Once this was refused, 
it was still possible that some other aspect of his life could be bequeathed to his “friends.” 
At stake here is how Seneca understood not just his legacy, but the actual content to be 
conveyed. This other possibility, thus the specification that his legacy was to have, is 
formulated by Tacitus in the following terms (Tac. Ann. 15.62): 
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he bequeathed to them the only, but still the noblest [pulcherrimum] 
possession yet remaining to him, the image of his life [imaginem vitae 
suae], which, if they remembered [si memores essent], they would win a 
name for moral worth and friendship defined by constancy [constantis 
amicitiae]. 
 
His life had an image or pattern. And it must be noted that it is “his” (suae) life. His life 
would be exemplary. It would form the pattern. As significantly that pattern or image 
could be remembered. Remembering as a form of following, the legacy as conveyed, 
would allow for the attribution of moral worth to those who remembered it. In addition, it 
would form, so Seneca’s proclamation runs, the basis of genuine and thus constant 
friendships.  
 Tacitus is right, given the frame of reference, to describe “life” here in terms of an 
image or pattern. This is the term that would have to be used precisely because it is one 
that accords with the language of the mold and thus with the activity of forming or 
molding. The former allows for that activity to take place. The image has a determining 
effect. In Epistulae morales 92, after having conceded that the human has a flawed 
nature, Seneca goes on to note that this propensity for the bad can be overcome.
11
 And 
yet, even excising it does not lead directly to the good. While a type of determination 
prevails, it is linked to a specific form of contingency. Hence the complex formulation 
that such a person, non est adhuc bonus, sed in bonum fingitur (“is not yet good, but is 
being molded to goodness”). This description of the self is reinforced by the reference to 
Vergil that occurs a few lines later in the Letter.
12
 The passage in question deploys a line 
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from the Aeneid that evokes the person “in whose body virtue and the soul are present” 
(si cui virtus animusque in corpore praesens) to then add that such a person is “equal to 
the gods” (deos aequat). The question, of course, is what does “equal” mean in this 
context,
13
 noting of course that the question of equality has to be limited by possibility.  
In the De vita beata Seneca suggests that the recognition that “true happiness” is 
“based on virtue” allows for a stand to be taken in relation to both vice and the good in 
which one—the stand taker—may “embody God” (deum effingas). That possibility is of 
course mediated from the start by the addition qua fas est (“as far as is allowed,” Sen. De 
vita beata 16.1).
14
 What is meant by equality is therefore far more complex than would 
be provided by a response that was no more than the simple assertion of an assumed form 
of sameness or identity. As a result, any attempt to engage this problem—the meaning of 
equality—can only be given once it can be assumed that the human is not identical to the 
gods but a process of making and molding allows the imperfect to perfect itself. If, as 
Vergil wrote, such is a person is the one “in whose body virtue and the soul are present” 
then what matters is the manifestation of that quality. In other words, what is at stake is a 
body housing elements whose initial presence allows for perfection and as such virtue has 
to be allowed to emerge. While the formulations are in both instances different, there are 
two references to the process of forming and imitation that occur in De vita beata and 
that are central to the argument being developed here. Both provide further insight into 
Seneca’s continual formulation and reformulation of what in the context of his writings 
the ethical subject is taken to be. 
In the first instance, and again after conceding both the possibility and reality of 
corruption, what allows humans a way out is their status as molders or formers of their 
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own lives (artifex vitae, Sen. De vita beata 8.3). The second is more extended. After a 
general argument concerning the relationship between human activity and nature, the 
“happy life” is taken to be the same thing as living “according to nature” (secundum 
naturam, Sen. Ep. 41.9, 121.3). Wisdom emerges in this context. Seneca comes to define 
wisdom in relation to the process in which human beings form themselves according to 
the law of nature. From this there is the general though fundamental conclusion to be 
drawn, namely, that the “happy life … is a life that is in harmony with its own nature” 
(beata est ergo vita conveniens naturae suae, Sen. De vita beata 3.2–4). The important 
question here is why “nature” is qualified such that what is at stake is living in relation to 
the nature that is proper not just to life, but to the life of a subject that is always specific. 
(Recalled here is, of course, the way Seneca’s legacy is an “image” that would allow 
lives to be lived in accord with it.) What sets the measure is therefore internal to life. 
Nature, if only in this instance has an externality that controls what is taking place within 
life. It is as though life in having its own “nature” has its own sense of propriety. The 
telos of life is therefore internal to life. The immediate contrast is of course with the 
formulations of Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus as they both appear in passages cited by 
Diogenes Laertius (7.86–90). Zeno’s formulation is: “Living in agreement with nature” 
(τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν). This is of course for Zeno the telos of life.15 Again 
following the formulation in Diogenes Laertius, for Chrysippus the nature of the 
individual is inextricably part of the nature of “the whole” (τοῦ ὅλου).16 At stake here, 
therefore, is a thinking of the relationship between the human and the natural in terms set 
by the interplay of the microcosm and the macrocosm. The latter is exemplified 
throughout Seneca’s writings. Hence, “God’s place in the universe corresponds to the 
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soul’s relation to man” (Ep. 65.24) and then, “all that you behold, that which comprise 
both God and man is one [unum est]—we are parts of one great body [membra sumus 
corporis magni] (95.52). While self-molding is the human project, God is self-made. The 
well-known formulation found in Lactantius’ quotation from Seneca’s Exhortations 
makes this clear: deus ipse se fecit.
17
 
The problem that arises here concerns the extent to which there might be a tension 
between two different settings. In the first instance, it is a setting delimited by the relation 
of macrocosm/microcosm as that which defines the connection between the human and 
God. In the second, the setting is created by the attribution of a “nature” that is proper to 
human being. The tension arises because while both pertain to the nature of human being, 
the second does not depend upon God for that self-definition. What did Seneca mean in 
the Natural Questions when in response to the question “What is important?”, one answer 
was “to be mindful of being a man” (hominis meminisse, Sen. Q Nat. 3.praef.15.)  
What was it of which one was mindful? Rather than address this question directly it is 
perhaps more important to start with the relation to God. It is not as though for Seneca 
this is an arbitrary relation. In Letter 41 God is described (remember that Seneca is 
writing to Lucilius) as “within you” (intus est, Sen. Ep. 41.1). Again the Aeneid is cited. 
Vergil aids by allowing a further clarification. Vergil introduces a limitation since who 
the Gods are is “uncertain” (incertum). And yet, despite this uncertainty what cannot be 
disputed is that “your soul will be deeply affected by a certain religious intimation”—a 
position advanced within the imagery of the sun. The human is touched by God, the way 
the ground is warmed by the sun’s rays. Those rays still form part of the sun from which 
they came.
18
 Touching they imbue a certain quality. Even within this setting the human 
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has a determined outcome. The human is “born” with a good that is there to be realized. 
That possibility can occur because of that which is proper to human being. (Hence a 
specific modality of the proper informs the ethical subject.) The formulation Seneca 
provides for this set up has an exacting concision, proprium hominis est. As to what this 
quality is, once again Seneca’s language is precise: “It is soul and reason brought to 
perfection in the soul. For man is a reasoning animal” (animus et ratio in animo perfecta. 
rationale enim, animal est homo, Ep. 41.8). At this point in the Epistle in response to the 
question of what is it that reason demands of the human being, the answer comes full 
circle: “to live according to his own nature” (secundum naturam suam vivere). Again, the 
conception of nature that arises here is delimited. It is the nature of human being. Nature 
has been internalized. (Though equally, if the position noted in Tacitus is retained, it will 
also be the case that Seneca’s legacy is delimited by his image. The generality of human 
being here is also is the singularity of Seneca.) There is, however, an important additional 
point that needs to be made. For Seneca, what is meant by the living out of this nature, 
equally of taking the exemplary subject as setting a similar measure, is that to the extent 
its lived presence can be either observed or remembered, then such activities, such modes 
of life, endure as unproblematically realizable. The presence of virtue is clear rather than 
irredeemably hidden. The response to the virtue is itself located within a setting in which 
one dignified subject encounters another. Clarity obtains. Seneca notes, “For virtue, 
though obscured [obscura] is never concealed, but always gives signs of its presence [sed 
mittit sui signa]: whoever has dignity [dignus] can trace her out by her footsteps” (Tranq. 
3.7). Signs take the place of the concealed. Virtue, while not self-evident, is present in 
ways that can be followed. Virtue can be tracked. It is possible to follow that which has 
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exemplary force. The having of dignity allows virtue to be recognized. There is a mode 
of recognition that sustains dignity. Virtue, in other words, has it own form of enargeia.
19
 
The presentation of virtue and the virtuous has to be thought in terms of immediacy and 
as a result virtue is always continuous with its own actuality. While the subject is located 
within the structure created by the microcosm/macrocosm in which God has a necessary 
presence, it is also the case that the ethical subject can be attributed qualities almost 
independently of that connection. The latter involves the effective presence of reason. 
The complexity that this engenders can be located in the difficulty of thinking a relation 
between the human and the divine that is not structured by what might be described as the 
logic of incarnation even though that is precisely what is occurring here.
20
  
What has to be taken up next is the question of who this subject is. While dignity 
may be there in what is taken to be the nature of human being, what is equally as true is 
that dignity is both an intrinsic quality and an actual quality. There is no impediment to 
dignity’s actualization. It is a quality, a potentiality, of human being, though it is one in 
which being human is always individuated as a singular subject. Its universality resides in 
the human as a “reasoning animal” and thus not as a human within any form of 
collectivity that would allow for or restrict dignity’s actual present. Dignity would be 
linked to a state of any one individual soul; moreover, dignity would then continue to be 
defined, as a result, in terms of the sovereign subject. What is beginning to emerge is the 
way the ethical subject is being thought.  
 
II 
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The question is how is this subject, the ethical subject, here the one open to virtue, to be 
understood. In the De beneficiis a response to this question is provided in such a way as 
to strip away any outer coatings this self may have had in order that the human itself 
emerge. What occurs as a result is what might be described as that specific thinking of 
singularity that involves the interarticulation of the singular and nudity. One is present 
with the other. Taken together they construct a specific modality within a more 
generalized metaphysics of nudity. This occurs a number of times in Seneca’s writings. 
As part of an attempt to delimit the appearance of anger he asks, what if (the soul) “could 
be shown naked” (nudus ostenderetur, De ira 36.2)? Then, more significantly, in a 
passage addressing questions of slavery, the address occurs in a way that saves the slave 
insofar as the slave is linked, as will be noted, to the “right of man,” while condemning 
the slave, at the same time, to perpetual slavery since slavery, the arguments then 
continues, does not restrict the reciprocity of exchange that defines an economy of 
benefits. Seneca’s formulation is exact (De beneficiis 18.2): 
  
Moreover, he who denies that a slave can sometimes give a benefit to his 
master is ignorant of the rights of man [praeterea servum qui negat dare 
aliquando domino beneficium, ignarus est iuris humani]; for, not the 
status, but the intention, of the one who bestows is what counts. No one is 
precluded from virtue [nulli praeclusa virtus est]; it is open to all, admits 
all, invites all, the freeborn and the freedman, the slave and the king, and 
the exile; neither family nor fortune determines its choice—it is satisfied 
with the naked human being [nudo homine contenta est].  
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The argument as a whole concerns the logical structure of beneficence. That structure 
involves a form of reciprocity in which intentionality, that is, the operation of the will to 
give and receive, has to endure as paramount. Indeed, as already noted above, it 
supersedes the determination of any one position—for example, slave, king, freeborn—
within the economy that it creates. Slaves can be beneficent. This can occur precisely 
because their position as slaves, the argument has to be, is irrelevant to the effective 
functioning of that logic.
21
 This is clear from the way the formulation of the position is 
continued by Seneca in the De beneficiis (18.3): 
 
It is possible for a slave to be just, it is possible for him to be brave, it is 
possible for him to be magnanimous; therefore it is possible also for him 
to give a benefit, for this also is one part of virtue. 
 
What emerges is of course the apparently virtuous slave. There is, of course, a 
presupposition here. Moreover, it is a presumption on which the overall position depends, 
namely the claim that the subject of virtue is “the naked human being.” And yet, the 
metaphysics of nudity, in its very formulation, yields what might be positioned as a 
countermeasure.
22
 In place of the necessity of nudity’s link to a form authenticity, there is 
Arendt’s recognition of its inherent limitation. Part of what allowed for the advent of the 
totalitarian is that, in her terms, “the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness 
of being human.”23 (The use of the term “sacred” should be noted here.) It should also be 
noted that her discussion of Heidegger and “care” that occurs in The Life of the Mind 
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makes one reference, following Heidegger, to the “nakedness” of the being who 
discovers itself thrown into the world.
24
 The argument is going to be that mere 
“throwness,” the subject of pure exposure, opens up a need to think care in ways that a 
response to what this subject elicits does not depend upon exposure understood in terms 
of simple (literal) nakedness. There will have to be more. That possibility alludes, almost 
as a matter of course, to the inscription of an original quality that will always been there 
with this “nakedness” even though it is not reducible to it. To which it should be added 
that there are different possibilities within such a set-up. Emmanuel Levinas, for 
example, draws a distinction between what he refers to as “the nudity of the face” (la 
nudité du visage) and literal nudity.25 The latter is the result of a dévoilement. The nudity 
of the face is that which is given within relationality prior to the emergence of 
instructions to act. Here, in contrast to Seneca, there is a conception of nudity that is 
defined by the insistence of relationality. Nudity is there as a given condition. While not 
the same as Arendt’s own arguments, this position does, at the very least, through the 
insistence on relationality and the implicit critique of the isolated singular subject 
establish a point of connection between Levinas and Arendt.
26
 
Arendt’s engagement with the ethical subject within Seneca (and thus by 
extension within versions of Stoicism both ancient and contemporary) is not to be found 
in the few allusions or references to either Seneca or Stoicism that occur in her writings. 
On the contrary, it can be located in her implicit commitment to what might be described 
as another strand of Roman thought. If her lead were followed, it would be Roman 
thought’s other possibility. It occurs in her understanding of how that mode of thinking 
conceived of life. She wrote: 
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Thus the language of the Romans, perhaps the most political people we 
have known, used the words ‘to live’ and ‘to be among men’ {inter 
homines esse} … as synonyms.27 
 
The contrast is not to be thought simply in terms of an opposition between clothed and 
unclothed; if there is a point at which there is a redress to Seneca’s evocation of nudity 
then it can located in her Latin formulation inter homines esse. However, it is essential to 
be precise here. While it may not always be pursued with systematic rigor, Arendt’s 
thinking of the ethical subject is defined not by the human as such but by the assertion of 
a form of relationality. Within the formulation inter homines esse what has to be 
privileged is the “inter.” What that means, as Peg Birmingham has argued, is that “The 
right of sovereignty, individual and collective, is replaced with the right to belong to an 
organized political space with its inherent plurality of actors.”28 The implication is that 
entry into this plurality cannot be assumed. There is a place of belonging. The 
commonality in question is only ever ontological. Dignity defines the potentiality of 
human being within it. Asserting presence, occupying what Arendt refers to as the “space 
of appearance,” is a claim about the “inter” and thus also a claim about what it means to 
figure within it.
29
 As such that figuring becomes the affirmation of a form of relationality. 
(Equally the refusal of relationality is not the singular but the production of the singular 
as existing within a constituted without relation.
30
 An act of constitution that marks in 
advance singularity as an after-effect of a constituting act.) As a consequence it cannot be 
a self either as a singular object who returns to its self either through self-making or the 
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processes resulting from remembering/imitating. There cannot be acts of self-constitution 
because there are only ever selves within relationality or excluded from it. Both moments 
are essential loci of activity. Place is constituted and thus reconstituted by and through 
the ways modes of inclusion and exclusion occur. An important additional point here is 
that the place from which exclusion would occur is the space understood as the locus of 
“speech and action.”31 Given that for Arendt “speech and action” are integral to the 
definition of being human—both take place with others and thus both affirm the original 
status of relationality—they also indicate why, from Arendt’s perspective, it makes little 
sense to argue that the slave can be virtuous when the slave is by definition excluded 
from full participation in the place of life. And yet, despite elements of his 
argumentation, it can be suggested that the slave’s vulnerable body is a constitute element 
of their being of which Seneca is aware. (This latter will emerge.) 
 If nudity is taken as a form of exposure then while the soul should appear as it is, 
presence as self presence, Seneca is keenly aware that the body demands that form of 
care in which nudity as exposure should be avoided. Hence in De vita beata he notes, “I 
would rather show [ostendere] the state of my soul [mihi animi] clad rather in a toga and 
shoes than showing naked shoulders [nudis scapulis] and with cuts on my feet” (25.2)32 
The point is straightforward. The state of the soul, while indifferent to the body’s 
predicament, cannot efface the body’s own vulnerability. Clothing becomes both the 
acknowledgment and the engagement with that state of affairs. This most compelling 
account of human vulnerability occurs in Epistulae morales 95. In a direct engagement 
with the nature of human being, Seneca notes in an account of human cruelty and the 
repositioning of death as a form of sport that this occurs despite the fact that the human is 
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a “sacred thing” (sacra res) in the eyes of others. (Here, of course, is the identification of 
the scared with mere human presence in a way that has no effect. It is as though the 
human is pointlessly sacred. The sacred is not positioned within a calculus. The sacred 
becomes therefore the interplay of the incalculable and the fragile. This is of course 
Arendt’s point.) For this denial of the “sacred” to have occurred, morality, he suggests, 
has become “perverse.” Evidence for which is the training of combatants for a 
“spectacle” in which humans become corpses. Those who enter this arena could be 
described as having been produced as “naked and defenseless” (nudus inermisque, Sen. 
Ep. 95.33). Again there is nudity. Here, however, nudity is the mark of pure exposure, 
absolute fragility standing forth. It is the mark of those to be killed. This could be the 
body of the slave. There is therefore a doubling within nudity.  
 What is it to engage exposure? The answer, as will become clear, is that it is to 
engage this doubling. Seneca’s response in the Letter involves the inculcation of virtue. 
This leads firstly to a discussion of the human relation to the divine, then to the 
engagement with specific virtues, and finally to the lives of virtuous men. In other words, 
the threat of exposure lead to a response situated in the gradual refining of the specificity 
of human being. That specificity is of course located in the human as a singularity. Note 
for example the argument that “conduct will not be right unless the will [voluntas] to act 
is right [recta] for this is the source of conduct. Not again can the will be right without 
the right attitude of the soul [animi]; for this is the source of the will” (Sen. Ep. 95.57). 
This, however, is unsatisfactory. The right attitude of the soul is not a defense for those 
who are “thrust forth naked and defenceless.” The only counter to such a set-up involves 
breaking with a form of reciprocity that demands equality since that structure has already 
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broken down. This is the crucial point.  
Aristotle accounts for why there has been the establishment of a shrine to the Graces in a 
public place in the following terms: “to remind men to return a kindness; for that is a 
special characteristic of grace, since it is a duty not only to repay a service done one, but 
another time to take the initiative in doing a service oneself” (Eth. Nic. 1133a 3). In other 
words, there is an essential reciprocity of relation. It is precisely this point that also 
occurs in Seneca’s account of the Three Graces in the De beneficiis (3.1–7). 
 
Why do the sisters hand in hand dance in a ring which returns upon itself? 
For the reason that a benefit passing in its course from hand to hand 
returns nevertheless to the giver; the beauty of the whole is destroyed if 
the course is anywhere broken, and it has most beauty if it is continuous 
and maintains an uninterrupted succession. 
 
Here is a modality of relation. Equally, this is another instance of the metaphysics of 
nudity since in Seneca’s formulation “the maidens wear flowing robes, and these, too, are 
transparent because benefits desire to be seen.” They are for all intents and purposes 
naked. This does, of course, account for the presence of the Three Graces in Botticelli’s 
Primavera.
33
  
Nudity, therefore, can neither aid nor diminish the threat of exposure. Exposure as 
a threat is, after all, the other modality of nudity. It cannot be overcome by any evocation 
of “the naked human being.” Indeed, it can be argued that Seneca realized that when he 
noted that the presence of the human as a “sacred thing” could always be refused. 
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Evidence of this refusal, the forgetting of the “sacred,” was the production, and it should 
be noted that it is a form of production, of given human beings as both “naked” and 
“defenseless.” The response to nudity is neither clothing nor a reinvestment in nudity’s 
presence as an exemplification of the sacred. The status of the ethical subject remains the 
same in both instances. The response is the refusal of the centrality of the putative 
primacy of the subject as original (and originally naked). In other words, the response 
inheres in attributing centrality not to the relation that effaces the differences that carry 
within them disequilibria of power (e.g., slave/freeman) but to that other form of relation 
that is marked by an insistent having-to-appear that needs guarantees rather than being 
assumed as axiomatic. This is the mode of relationality that for Arendt circumscribes the 
cogency of Roman political thought; namely the originality of the “inter” in the 
formulation “inter homines esse.” The rethinking of dignity has to incorporate therefore 
the affirmation of this specific mode of relationality whilst recognizing that appearance 
continues as an insistent and urgent question.  
 
Monash University/Kingston University 
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1
 The term ethical subject is used here to outline a field of inquiry. Central to the overall 
project will be an engagement both with how this term is used by Dennis Schmidt and 
how he distinguishes between what he calls the “ethical subject” and the “lyrical subject.” 
Both of which are instances of the thinking of what is referred to here as the ethical 
subject. See Schmidt 2005. I engage directly with Schmidt’s work in Benjamin 2017b. 
2
 This is the position I have tried to argue in my Virtue in Being. See Benjamin 2016b.  
3
 Arendt 1958, 7. For a sustained examination of Arendt’s relation to Roman philosophy 
see Hammer 2002. The important point to note, as Hammer makes clear, is that Arendt’s 
relation to Roman thought involved a commitment to the implicit conception of history 
and thus historical time that occurred within it rather than any sustained engagement with 
any conception of self. 
4
 See to this end Benjamin 2016a. 
5
 While the project of this paper is to begin to develop a specific formulation of the 
conception of the self in Seneca, in part this is to be able to contest the singularity of the 
self that occurs in his writings to the conception of the plural and relational self in 
Arendt, it should not be thought that there has not already been a sustained engagement 
within Seneca’s conception of the self. For an overview of this project, one that covers all 
aspects of Seneca’s writings, see the papers collected in Bartsch and Wray 2009. 
6
 Even though it cannot be done in the context of this paper, clearly what would need to 
be taken up here is the work of both Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot. What remains as 
open questions is the extent to which an attempt to redeploy the ethical implication of 
“self-care” can escape the primacy of the individual. See Foucault 1994 and Hadot 2002. 
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7
 There is an important connection here between this conception of liberty and the 
development in De beneficiis of giving “benefits” as an act not dictated by obligation but 
by a form of freedom. See Griffin 2013, 23.  
8
 It should not be thought that this evocation of an art of life does not admit of 
argumentation. In Seneca De otio 1.3–2.1, while the formulation is different, in response 
to the position that evokes “the common good” (communi bono), Seneca responds that it 
is possible to withdraw from the world, contemplate truth, to live rationally (rationem 
vivendi) and that such activities remain consistent with Stoicism. At work here is, of 
course, the implicit construction of the ethical subject.  
9
 The creation of an image to be followed or imitated is also discussed by Schofield 
(2015, 68–70). Moreover, there is an important connection between the presence of the 
exemplary image in Seneca’s ostensibly philosophical writings and his tragedies. For a 
superb discussion of this connection see Stanley 2010.  
10
 Walker 1963; Dyson 1970, 71. 
11
 Rosenmeyer 2000. 
12
 For a discussion of Seneca’s use of Vergil and thus his recourse to a specific 
hermeneutic strategy, see Batinski 1993. 
13
 Russell 2004, 252. 
14
 Though it should be noted that in De constantia 6.8 in addressing Serenus he describes 
himself as “this perfect man, full of virtues human and divine” (pefectum illum virum, 
humanis divinisque virtutibus plenum). 
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15
 The interesting question would be the relationship between this point and Plato’s 
argument in the Theaetetus that links escape from the world, perhaps evasion as a form of 
retirement to the process of homoiosis to theo. To this end, see Pl. Tht. 176a–b. 
16
 Asmis 1990. 
17
 This fragment appears in Haase 1853, 421. See also the important reference in 
Epistulae morales 53.11, in which the relation is given a specific temporal determination: 
“The wise man’s life spreads out to him over as large a surface as does all eternity to a 
God.”  
18
 Recalled here is the presence and effect of the sun in Plato. See Resp. 507b–509c. 
19
 See, in this instance, the discussion in Staley 2010, 58–60. For a more detailed 
elaboration of the term and its place in both ancient philosophy and rhetoric, see Plett 
2012. 
20
 I have discussed the work of this logic in the context of St John of Damascus in 
Benjamin 2017a.  
21
 A similar structure of argumentation can also be found in Neo-Stoicism. In a fragment 
of Hierocles that is cited in Stobaeus’ Anthology the way people are treated is premised 
on “supposing that one is oneself that person and that the person is oneself.” The 
argument takes as the example that establishes the general claim of the slave. Again, 
there would be the assumption of a reciprocity of treatment based on the general claim of 
just treatment. What this allows is that conception of just treatment that sustains the 
presence of slavery. See Ramelli 2009, 87. 
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22
 The counter measure is not simply oppositional. It is the response that counters the 
prevailing position from within the terms set by the framework that generated that 
position in the first place.  
23
 Arendt 1951, 295. This line from Arendt has been subject to sustained and varying 
forms of discussion. See, e.g., Bernstein 1996; Birmingham 2006. 
24
 Arendt 1971, 182. 
25
 See Levinas 1990, 72. Moreover, the importance of Levinas can be located in the way 
that his departure from “possessive individualism” is formulated. In Robert Bernasconi’s 
(2008, 176) terms, this occurs “by constructing the event of identity in being for another 
that undoes the conception of personal identity on which liberalism relies.” 
26
 For a sustained discussion the relation between Arendt and Levinas, see Topolski 2015. 
27
 Arendt 1958, 7–8. 
28
 Birmingham 2006, 36. 
29
 This is a key term for Arendt. It is defined in The Human Condition thus: “The space 
of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and 
action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and 
the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can 
be organized” (Arendt 1958, 199). 
30
 This term has been developed in much greater detail in my work. See Benjamin 2010; 
2015. In other words, if relationality is understood as an original condition such that 
plurality—itself a mode of relationality—always precedes the singular, it then follows 
that a singularity posited as without relation is a produced state. What endures is the 
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relation as anoriginal. The latter—the anoriginal—is a term that marks the presence of a 
founding plurality. See Benjamin 1993, 2016. 
31
 Arendt 1958. 176. 
32
 See, in addition, De providentia 4.13–14. 
33
 For an account of the significance of Seneca’s version of the Three Graces on the 
history of art and especially Botticelli, see Dempsey 1971. 
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